CITATION: Precious Metal Capital Corp. v. Smith, 2008 ONCA 577 |
DATE: 20080807 |
DOCKET: C48657-C48666-C48670 |
COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO |
DOHERTY, MOLDAVER and CRONK JJ.A. |
BETWEEN: |
PRECIOUS METAL CAPITAL CORP. |
Plaintiff (Respondent) |
and |
GREGORY CHARLES SMITH, TAGHMEN VENTURES LIMITED, NHG CAPITAL LIMITED, GREGORY JACK PEEBLES, HAVILAND MANAGEMENT INC., HAVILAND INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES INC. LIMITED aka HAVILAND INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES LIMITED, EURO AMERICAS SECURITIES LIMITED, INTERNATIONAL CONSOLIDATED MINERALS LIMITED, INTERNATIONAL CONSOLIDATED MINERALS (UK) LIMITED, INTERNATIONAL CONSOLIDATED MINERALS (PERU) LIMITED, COMPANIA MNERA ICM S.A.C., ICM MILLOTINGO S.A.C., ICM PACHAPAQUI S.A.C., ICM PROCESADORA S.A.C. and PLATINUM DIVERSIFIED MINING INC. |
Defendants (Appellants) |
J. Thomas Curry and Catherine Powell for the appellants, NHG Capital Limited, Gregory Charles Smith and Taghmen Ventures Limited |
Susan Chapman for the appellants, Gregory Jack Peebles, Haviland Management Inc. and Haviland International Resources Limited Brad Berg and Katherine McEachern for the appellants,
International Consolidated Minerals (
Gary Sugar for the respondent, Precious Metal Capital Corp. |
Heard: May 13 and 14, 2008 |
On appeal from the order of Justice S. Lederman of the Superior Court of Justice (commercial list), dated April 2, 2008, reported at [2008] O.J. No. 1236. |
DOHERTY J.A.: |
[1] This is an appeal from the order of Lederman J. (the motion judge) dismissing the defendants’ (appellants’) motion for an order dismissing or staying the action brought against them by the respondent (plaintiff). The order further provided that the ex juris service on the non-Ontario defendants was valid under Rule 17.02(h). The non-Ontario defendants also appeal this order.
[2] The
order staying or dismissing the action was sought first on the basis that
the
[3] The
appellants contend that the motion judge erred in law in holding that an
[4] I would dismiss the appeals substantially for the reasons given by the motion judge, although I arrive at the same result on the jurisdictional question by a somewhat different route.
[5] The reasons of the motion judge are reported at [2008] O.J. No. 1236. I will not repeat his careful summary of the factual background. These reasons should be read in conjunction with the motion judge’s reasons.
[6] There
are nine defendants, seven of which are not
[7] The
plaintiff alleges that it hired the
[8] The
plaintiff contends that Peebles and his company, and Smith and his companies,
owed a fiduciary duty and a duty of confidentiality to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff further contends in his claim that, through a series of events
and transaction, Peebles, Smith and various corporate entities controlled
by them breached those duties, allowing Smith and companies he controlled
eventually to take the mining opportunities in
[9] The
characterization of the plaintiff’s claim was an important step in the determination
of whether the
[10] The characterization of the claims depends in large measure on the contents of the statement of claim. That document is long and in some respects unclear. The motion judge reviewed the claim and the additional material filed on the motion. He did not accept the appellants’ contention that the plaintiff’s lawsuit was in essence a series of claims based on alleged breaches of the contracts. He characterized the claim in this way at paras. 19-20:
I accept the plaintiff’s characterization of this claim as, in pith and substance, centering on the fiduciary relationship between PMCC and Peebles and Smith. The allegation is that the two deliberately orchestrated events to put PMCC at a disadvantage, to ultimately pursue the Peruvian opportunities in their own interests. The objects of an agency relationship should not be the sole determinant of that relationship’s character.
This alleged orchestration included improprieties in preparing and executing the loan advance documents and the Asset Purchase Agreement. However, this case is not about Smith’s loans to PMCC or the Asset Purchase Agreement: it is about an allegedly abusive course of conduct by fiduciaries. The suit is not contractual in substance. Although PMCC has specifically pleaded a breach of the Asset Purchase Agreement, on a review of the Amended Statement of Claim as a whole, I am satisfied that the references to the loan advances and Asset Purchase Agreement serve as illustrations or iterations of the defendants’ breaches of their duties of confidence, loyalty and good faith and as part of a broader narrative of abusive conduct. [Emphasis added.]
[11] I agree with the motion judge’s characterization of the claim.
[12] The other significant feature of the claim for jurisdictional purposes arises out of the remedies sought by the plaintiff. In essence, the plaintiff seeks orders in the nature of disgorgement of the profits the defendants gained as a result of the alleged breaches of their duties to the plaintiff. The disgorgement takes the form of a constructive trust over any interest any of the defendants have in the Peruvian properties, or a constructive trust over the shares in various foreign corporate defendants.
[13] The
motion judge set out his reasons for holding that the
[14] Having
determined that the
[15] I take a somewhat different approach to the jurisdictional question, but arrive at the same result. I do not favour the two-stage analysis engaged in by the motion judge in which he first considered jurisdiction based on the nature of the remedy sought and then turned to the broader question of the sufficiency of the connection of the action to Ontario to justify the assumption of jurisdiction over non-Ontario defendants.
[16]
[17] The
nature of the remedy sought in the action, particularly if the remedy relates
to a foreign immovable such as land, will play an important and sometimes
even determinative role in the application of the real and substantial connection
test. However, remedy related considerations, such as those identified in
the four-part test in Catania, should be considered within the broader
context of the various factors identified as relevant to the real and substantial
connection test: see Khan Resources Inc. v. W.M. Mining Company (2006),
79 O.R. (3d) 411 at paras. 7-10 (
[18] I
see no analytical advantage, where as in this case and
The court must have in personam jurisdiction over the defendant.
[19] I
agree with the appellants’ contention that Lederman J. erred at para. 28
in holding that for the purpose of the
I agree with the motion court judge that Rule 17.02(h) is procedural in nature and does not by itself confer jurisdiction.
[20] In
personam jurisdiction, which is not based on the presence of the defendant
(as it was in Catania) or the defendant’s attornment to the jurisdiction,
can exist only where there is a sufficient connection between the action
and Ontario to warrant assumption of jurisdiction over that action by the
Ontario court. The real and substantial connection test measures the sufficiency
of that connection. Consequently, in cases of assumed jurisdiction, what
is described in
[21] The
comprehensive approach to the determination of whether an
· The jurisdiction cannot be exercised if the local court cannot supervise the execution of the judgment; and
· The court will not exercise jurisdiction if the order would have no effect in the situs.
[22] Both of these factors can be addressed under Muscutt’s sixth and/or eighth factors:
· The court’s willingness to recognize and enforce an extra provincial judgment rendered on the same jurisdictional basis.
· Comity and the standards of jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement prevailing elsewhere.
[23] Recognizing that the real and substantial connection test is the single test for determining whether an Ontario court can assume jurisdiction over out of province defendants in no way diminishes the relevance of the Catania factors where the remedy sought affects foreign immovables. Performing the entire jurisdictional analysis within the real and substantial connection framework does, however, best achieves the flexibility and holistic inquiry favoured by Muscutt.
[24] Although
the motion judge treated the real and substantial connection inquiry as discrete
from and following upon the consideration of the
There is no barrier
to this court’s supervising the execution of the judgment. It bears emphasizing,
in light of the defendants’ arguments, that this factor does not require
the local court to facilitate or carry out the judgment. The transfers
must be carried out according to the requirements of foreign law, whatever
they may be in order to comply with the
[25] I
also see no error in the motion judge’s analysis of the Muscutt factors. I
would, however, make one observation, that in my view fortifies the correctness
of the decision reached by the motion judge. At para. 38 of his reasons,
the motion judge described Smith’s connection with
[26] Smith
had a potentially significant connection to
[27] I
agree with the motion judge’s finding that the
[28] Having
determined that an
In sum, this
action has connections to
[29] Unlike
the jurisdictional determination, which raises a question of law reviewable
on a correctness standard, the motion judge’s determination that Ontario
was the convenient forum for this litigation, involves the exercise of judicial
discretion to which this court owes deference: B.N.P. Paribas (Canada)
v. B.C.E. Inc., [2007] 227 O.A.C. 102 at para. 4 (
[30] The
appellants could succeed before the motion judge on the forum non conveniens argument
only if by clearly establishing that some other jurisdiction, presumably
England, was a more appropriate forum than Ontario, the forum chosen by the
plaintiff: Achem Products Inc. v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation
Board), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 897 at 920-21. On appeal, the appellants must
show that the motion judge erred in principle, misapprehended material evidence,
or reached an unreasonable result: B.N.P. Paribas (
[31] Not surprisingly, the appellants’ submissions in support of their forum non conveniens argument track some of their jurisdictional arguments. The appellants placed considerable reliance on the submission that the motion judge mischaracterized the plaintiff’s action when he failed to appreciate that, in essence, it involved an allegation of breaches of a number of contracts, most of which contained provisions giving the English courts exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising out the agreements.
[32] As indicated above, I agree with the trial judge’s characterization of the claim as framed by the plaintiff. The claim alleged breaches by Peebles and Smith of fiduciary duties owed to the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, some of these breaches are made manifest in various documents, including some of the agreements relied on by the appellants. The exclusive jurisdiction provisions in those contracts do not, however, apply to this action as it was characterized by the trial judge. The appellants’ reliance on Z.I. Pompey Industrie, supra, is misplaced.
[33] The appellant’s other arguments on this issue invite this court to re-examine the factors the motion judge considered and redo the motion judge’s weighing and balancing process. That is no part of this court’s function.
[34] The
appellants have not shown any basis upon which to interfere with the motion
judge’s exercise of his discretion and his determination that the appellants
failed to demonstrate that some other jurisdiction was a more appropriate
forum for this litigation than
[35] Rule 17.02(h) permits service ex juris
In respect of
damage sustained in
[36] The
plaintiff seeks damages by way of an alternative remedy. The damage claimed
is not as thoroughly articulated in the statement of claim as are the plaintiff’s
other claims. The damage claim is, however, essentially a claim for the
money equivalent of the potential profits lost to the plaintiff when, according
to its allegation, the defendants misappropriated the various mining opportunities
in
[37] The
plaintiff, as indicated above, is an
[38] The
motion judge held that damages flowing from the alleged breaches constituted
damages sustained in
In my view, the
corporations here bringing action to the extent that they have suffered a
loss of profits and a loss of use of the machine, were disadvantaged and
were so disadvantaged at the place where their financial records were kept
and where they did business, namely at their head office in Ontario. The
damage sustained was so sustained, in my view, within
[39] I think the damage claim brings the action within rule 17.02(h).
[40] I would dismiss the appeals. If the parties cannot agree on costs they should exchange and file their submissions on costs within 30 days. Those submissions should not exceed four pages.
RELEASED: “DD” “AUG 07 2008”
“Doherty J.A.”
“I agree M.J. Moldaver J.A.”
“I agree E.A. Cronk J.A.”