DATE: 20110407 |
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DOCKET: C52187 & C52346 |
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COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO |
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MacPherson, Gillese and Juriansz JJ.A. |
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In the Matter of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended And in the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Indalex Limited, Indalex Holdings (B.C.) Ltd., 6326765 Canada Inc. and Novar Inc. |
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Applicants/Respondents |
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Andrew J. Hatnay and Demetrios Yiokaris for the Former Executives, appellants |
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Darrell L. Brown for the United Steelworkers, appellants |
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Mark Bailey for the Superintendent of Financial Services |
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Hugh O’Reilly and Adam Beatty for Morneau Sobeco Limited Partnership, Intervenor |
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Fred Myers and Brian Empey for Sun Indalex Finance, LLC |
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Ashley Taylor and Lesley Mercer for the Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada ULC |
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Harvey Chaiton and George Benchetrit for George L. Miller, the Chapter 7 Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estates of the US Indalex Debtors |
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Heard: November 23 and 24, 2010 |
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On appeal from the orders of Campbell J., of the Superior Court of Justice, dated February 18, 2010. |
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Gillese J.A.: |
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[1] A Canadian company is insolvent. Its pension plans are underfunded and in the process of being wound up. The company is the administrator of the pension plans.
[2] The company obtains protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (CCAA). A court order enables it to borrow funds pursuant to a debtor-in-possession (DIP) credit agreement. The order creates a “super-priority” charge in favour of the DIP lenders. The obligation to repay the DIP lenders is guaranteed by the company’s U.S. parent company (the Guarantee).
[3] The company is sold through the CCAA proceedings but the sale proceeds are insufficient to repay the DIP lenders. The U.S. parent company covers the shortfall, in accordance with its obligations under the Guarantee.
[4] The CCAA monitor holds some of the sale proceeds in a reserve fund. The pension plan beneficiaries claim the money based on the deemed trust provisions in the Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8 (PBA). The U.S. parent company claims the money based on its payment under the Guarantee.
[5] Must the money in the reserve fund be used to pay the deficiencies in the pension plans in preference to the secured creditor? What fiduciary obligations, if any, does the company have in respect of its underfunded pension plans during the CCAA proceeding? These appeals wrestle with these difficult questions.
[6] Indalex Limited was the sponsor and administrator of two registered pension plans: the Retirement Plan for Salaried Employees of Indalex Limited and Associated Companies (the Salaried Plan) and the Retirement Plan for Executive Employees of Indalex Limited and Associated Companies (the Executive Plan) (collectively, the Plans).
[7] On March 20, 2009, Indalex’s parent company and its U.S. based affiliates (collectively, Indalex U.S.) sought Chapter 11 protection in the United States.
[8] On April 3, 2009, Indalex Limited, Indalex Holdings (B.C.) Ltd., 6326765 Canada Inc. and Novar Inc. (Indalex or the Applicants) obtained protection from their creditors under the CCAA. At that time, the Salaried Plan was in the process of being wound up. Both Plans were underfunded. FTI Consulting Canada ULC (the Monitor) was appointed as monitor.
[9] On April 8, 2009, the court authorized Indalex to borrow funds pursuant to a DIP credit agreement. The court order gave the DIP lenders a super-priority charge on Indalex’s property. Indalex U.S. guaranteed Indalex’s obligation to repay the DIP lenders.
[10] On July 20, 2009, Indalex moved for approval of the sale of its assets on a going-concern basis. It also moved for approval to distribute the sale proceeds to the DIP lenders, with the result that there would be nothing to fund the deficiencies in the Plans. Without further payments, the underfunded status of the Plans will translate into significant cuts to the retirees’ pension benefits.
[11] At the sale approval hearing, the United Steelworkers appeared on behalf of its members who had been employed by Indalex and are the beneficiaries of the Salaried Plan (the USW). In addition, a group of retired executives appeared on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Executive Plan (the Former Executives).
[12] Both the USW and the Former Executives objected to the planned distribution of the sale proceeds. They asked that an amount representing the total underfunding of the Plans (the Deficiencies) be retained by the Monitor as undistributed proceeds, pending further court order. Their position was based on, among other things, the deemed trust provisions in the PBA that apply to unpaid amounts owing to a pension plan by an employer.
[13] The court approved the sale. However, as a result of the USW and Former Executives’ reservation of rights, the Monitor retained an additional $6.75 million of the sale proceeds in reserve (the Reserve Fund), an amount approximating the Deficiencies.[1]
[14] The sale closed on July 31, 2009. The sale proceeds were insufficient to repay the DIP lenders. Indalex U.S. paid the shortfall of approximately US$10.75 million, pursuant to its obligations under the Guarantee.
[15] In accordance with a process designed by the CCAA court, the USW and the Former Executives brought motions returnable on August 28, 2009, based on their deemed trust claims. They claimed the Reserve Fund was subject to deemed trusts in favour of the Plans’ beneficiaries and should be paid into the Plans in priority to Indalex U.S. They also claimed that during the CCAA proceedings, Indalex breached its fiduciary obligations to the Plans’ beneficiaries.
[16] Indalex then brought a motion in which it sought to lift the stay and assign itself into bankruptcy (the Indalex bankruptcy motion). This motion was directed to be heard on August 28, 2009, along with the USW and Former Executives’ motions.
[17] By orders dated February 18, 2010, (the Orders under Appeal), the CCAA judge dismissed the USW and Former Executives’ motions on the basis that, at the date of sale, no deemed trust under the PBA had arisen in respect of either plan. He found it unnecessary to decide the Indalex bankruptcy motion.
[18] The USW and the Former Executives (together, the appellants) appeal. They ask this court to order the Monitor to pay the Reserve Fund to the Plans.
[19] On November 5, 2009, the Superintendent of Financial Services (Superintendent) appointed the actuarial firm of Morneau Sobeco Limited Partnership (Morneau) as administrator of the Plans.
[20] Morneau was granted intervenor status. It supports the appellants.
[21] The Superintendent also appeared. He, too, supports the appellants.
[22] Sun Indalex, as the principal secured creditor of Indalex U.S., asks that the appeals be dismissed and the Reserve Fund be paid to it. As a result of its payment under the Guarantee, Indalex U.S. is subrogated to the rights of the DIP lenders. Its claim to the Reserve Fund is based on the super-priority charge.
[23] The Monitor appeared. It supports Sun Indalex and asks that the appeals be dismissed. The Monitor and Sun Indalex will be referred to collectively as the respondents.
[24] George L. Miller, the trustee of the bankruptcy estates of Indalex U.S., appointed under Chapter 7 of Title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the U.S. Trustee), was given leave to intervene. He joins with the Monitor and Sun Indalex in opposing these appeals.
[25] For the reasons that follow, I would allow the appeals and order the Monitor to pay, from the Reserve Fund, amounts sufficient to satisfy the deficiencies in the Plans. For ease of reference, the various statutory provisions to which I make reference can be found in the schedules at the end of these reasons.
[26] Indalex Limited is a Canadian corporation. It is the entity through which the Indalex group of companies operates in Canada. It is a direct wholly-owned subsidiary of its U.S. parent, Indalex Holding Corp., which in turn is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Indalex Finance.
[27] Together, the group of companies referred to as Indalex and Indalex U.S. were the second largest manufacturer of aluminum extrusions in the United States and Canada. Aluminum is a durable, light weight metal that can be strengthened through the extrusion process, which involves pushing aluminum through a die and forming it into strips, which can then be customized for a wide array of end-user markets.
[28] Indalex Limited produced a portion of the raw material used in the extrusion process, called aluminum extrusion billets, through its casting division located in Toronto. It also processed the raw extrusion billets into extruded product at its Canadian extrusion plants, for sale to end users. In 2008, Indalex Limited accounted for approximately 32% of the Indalex group of companies total sales to third parties.
[29] Indalex Limited provided separate pension plans for its executives and salaried employees. The Plans were designed to pay pension benefits for the lives of the retirees and those of their designated beneficiaries. Indalex Limited was the sponsor and administrator of both Plans. The Plans were registered with the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) and the Canadian Revenue Agency.
[30] The USW has several locals certified as bargaining agents on behalf of members employed with Indalex, including members who are beneficiaries of the Salaried Plan. It was certified to represent certain Indalex employees, seven of whom were members of the Salaried Plan and have deferred vested entitlements under that plan.
[31] The Salaried Plan contains a defined benefit and defined contribution component.
[32] Unlike the Executive Plan, the Salaried Plan was in the process of being wound up when Indalex began CCAA proceedings. The effective date of wind up is December 31, 2006. Special wind up payments were made in 2007 ($709,013), 2008 ($875,313) and 2009 ($601,000). As of December 31, 2008, the wind up deficiency was $1,795,600.
[33] All current service contributions have been made to the Salaried Plan.
[34] Article 4.02 of the Salaried Plan obligates Indalex to make sufficient contributions to the Salaried Plan. Article 14.03 of the Salaried Plan requires Indalex to remit “amounts due or that have accrued up to the effective date of the wind-up and which have not been paid into the Fund, as required by the Plan and Applicable Pension Legislation”.
[35] The Executive Plan is a defined benefit plan. Effective September 1, 2005, Indalex closed the Executive Plan to new members.
[36] As of January 1, 2008, there were eighteen members of the Executive Plan, none of whom were active employees.
[37] The Executive Plan is underfunded.
[38] As of January 1, 2008, the Executive Plan had an estimated funding deficiency, on an ongoing basis, of $2,535,100. On a solvency basis, the funding deficiency was $1,102,800 and on a windup basis, the deficiency was $2,996,400. An actuarial review indicated that as of July 15, 2009, the wind up deficiency had increased to an estimated $3,200,000.
[39] In 2008, Indalex made total special payments of $897,000 to the Executive Plan. No further special payments were due to be made to the Executive Plan until 2011. All current service contributions had been made.
[40] Due to its underfunded status, the Former Executives’ monthly pension benefits have already been cut by 30-40%. Unless money is paid into the Executive Plan, these cuts will become permanent. The Former Executives have also lost their supplemental pension benefits which were unfunded and terminated by Indalex after it obtained CCAA protection. Between the two cuts, the Former Executives have lost between one half and two-thirds of their pension benefits.
[41] On June 26, 2009, counsel for the Former Executives sent a letter to counsel to Indalex and the Monitor, advising that the Former Executives reserved all rights to the deemed trust under s. 57(4) of the PBA in the CCAA proceedings. There was no response or objection to that letter from Indalex, the Monitor or any other party.
[42] At the time the Orders under Appeal were made, the Executive Plan had not been wound up. However, a letter from counsel for the Monitor dated July 13, 2009, indicated that it was expected that the Executive Plan would be wound up.
[43] On March 10, 2010, the Superintendent issued a Notice of Proposal to wind up the Executive Plan effective as of September 30, 2009. The wind up process is currently underway.
Pension and Corporate Governance During the CCAA Proceedings
[44] Keith Cooper, the Senior Managing Director of FTI Consulting Inc., was a key advisor to the Indalex group of companies prior to and during the CCAA proceedings. On March 19, 2009, he was appointed the Chief Restructuring Officer for all of the Indalex U.S. based companies. However, he was responsible not only for Indalex U.S. but for the entire Indalex group of companies and subsidiaries, including the Applicants. Mr. Cooper described his role as being to maximize recovery for Indalex as a whole.
[45] Mr. Cooper was the primary negotiator of the DIP credit agreement on behalf of Indalex. He does not recall discussing Indalex’s pension obligations in respect of the Salaried and Executive Plans during the negotiation of the DIP credit agreement. He was aware that the Plans were underfunded and that pensions would be reduced if the shortfalls were not met.
[46] FTI Consulting Inc., the company for which Mr. Cooper works, and the Monitor are affiliated entities. The Monitor (FTI Consulting Canada ULC) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of FTI Consulting Inc.
[47] On July 31, 2009, all of the directors of Indalex resigned. On that same day, Indalex Holding Corp. (part of Indalex U.S.) became the management of Indalex. Thus, as of July 31, 2009, Indalex and Indalex U.S. formally had the same management.
[48] On August 12, 2009, a Unanimous Shareholder Declaration was executed in which Mr. Cooper was appointed to direct the affairs of all Indalex entities.
[49] On August 13, 2009, Indalex (which was now under the management of Indalex U.S.) announced its intention to bring a motion to bankrupt the Canadian company.
[50] On April 3, 2009, pursuant to the order of Morawetz J., Indalex obtained protection from its creditors under the CCAA (the Initial Order). A stay of proceedings against Indalex was ordered.
[51] On April 8, 2009, the Initial Order was amended to authorize Indalex to borrow funds pursuant to a DIP credit agreement among Indalex, Indalex U.S. and a syndicate of lenders (the DIP lenders). JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. was the administrative agent (the DIP Agent). The DIP credit agreement contemplated that the DIP loan would be repaid from the proceeds derived from a going-concern sale of Indalex’s assets on or before August 1, 2009.
[52] Indalex’s obligation to repay the DIP borrowings was guaranteed by Indalex U.S. The Guarantee was a condition to the extension of credit by the DIP lenders.
[53] Paragraph 45 of the Initial Order, as amended, is the super-priority charge. It provides that the DIP lenders’ charge “shall rank in priority to all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, statutory or otherwise”, other than the Administration Charge and the Directors’ Charge, as those terms are defined in the Initial Order.
[54] On June 12, 2010, Morawetz J. heard and granted a motion by the Applicants for approval of an amendment to the DIP credit agreement to increase the borrowings by about $5 million, from US$24.36 million to US$29.5 million. This resulted in an order dated June 12, 2009, further amending the Initial Order (the June 12, 2009 order).
[55] Counsel for the Former Executives was served with motion material on June 11, 2009, at 8:27 p.m. In response to an email from the Former Executives’ counsel questioning the urgency of the motion, the Monitor’s counsel responded that the motion was simply directed at obtaining more money under the DIP credit agreement.
[56] At the hearing of the motion on June 12, 2010, the Former Executives initially sought to reserve their rights to confirm that the motion was about an increase to the DIP and nothing more. When that was confirmed, the Former Executives withdrew their reservation and the motion proceeded later that afternoon.
[57] Indalex brought two motions that were heard on July 20, 2009, by Campbell J. (the CCAA judge).
[58] First, Indalex sought approval of a sale of its assets, as a going concern, to SAPA Holdings AB (SAPA). Total consideration for the sale of Indalex and Indalex U.S. was approximately US$151,183,000.00. The Canadian sale proceeds were to be paid to the Monitor.
[59] As a term of the sale, SAPA assumed no responsibility or liability for the Plans.
[60] Second, Indalex moved for approval of an interim distribution of the sale proceeds to the DIP lenders.
[61] Both the Former Executives and the USW objected to the planned distribution of the sale proceeds. They asserted statutory deemed trust claims in respect of the underfunded pension liabilities in the Plans, arguing that preference was to be given for amounts owing to the Plans pursuant to ss. 57 and 75 of the PBA. They also relied on s. 30(7) of the Ontario Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.10 (PPSA), which expressly gives priority to the deemed trust in the PBA over secured creditors.
[62] The Former Executives and the USW further argued that Indalex had breached its fiduciary duty to the Plans’ beneficiaries by failing to adequately meet its obligations under the Plans and by abdicating its responsibilities as administrator once CCAA proceedings had been undertaken.
[63] The court approved the sale in an order dated July 20, 2009 (the Sale Approval order). However, as a result of the USW and Former Executives’ reservation of rights, the Monitor retained an additional $6.75 million of the sale proceeds in reserve, an amount approximating the Deficiencies.
[64] It was agreed that an expedited hearing process would be undertaken in respect of the USW and Former Executives’ deemed trust claims and that the Reserve Fund held by the Monitor would be sufficient, if required, to satisfy the deemed trust claims.
The Guarantee is Called on
[65] On July 31, 2009, the sale to SAPA closed. The sale proceeds available for distribution were insufficient to repay the DIP loan in full. The Monitor made a payment of US$17,041,391.80 to the DIP Agent. This resulted in a shortfall of US$10,751,247.22 in respect of the DIP borrowings. The DIP Agent called on the Guarantee for the amount of the shortfall, which Indalex U.S. paid.
[66] The USW and Former Executives brought motions to determine their deemed trust claims. The motions were set for hearing on August 28, 2009. Indalex then filed its bankruptcy motion, in which it sought to file a voluntary assignment in bankruptcy.
[67] By orders dated February 18, 2010, the CCAA judge dismissed the USW and Former Executives’ motions.
[68] The CCAA judge found it unnecessary to deal with Indalex’s bankruptcy motion.
[69] The CCAA judge dismissed the Former Executives’ motion on the basis that since the wind up of the Executive Plan had not yet taken place, there were no deficiencies in payments to that plan as of July 20, 2009. As there were no deficiencies in payments, there was no basis for a deemed trust.
[70] Because the Salaried Plan was in the process of being wound up, the CCAA judge dismissed the USW motion for different reasons.
[71] The CCAA judge saw the issue raised on the USW motion to be whether the PBA required Indalex to pay the windup deficiency in the Salaried Plan as at the date of closing of the sale and transfer of assets, namely, July 20, 2009. In resolving the issue, the CCAA judge considered ss. 57 and 75 of the PBA. He called attention to the words “accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due” in s. 57(4).
[72] The CCAA judge also considered ss. 31(1) and (2) of R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 909 (the Regulations). He concluded that because s. 31 of the Regulations permitted Indalex to make up the deficiency in the Salaried Plan over a period of years, the amount of the yearly payments did not become due until it was required to be paid. Were it not for s. 31 of the Regulations, the CCAA judge stated that Indalex would have had an obligation under the PBA to pay in any deficiency as of the date of wind up.
[73] The CCAA judge concluded:
[49] … I find that as of the date of closing and transfer of assets there were no amounts that were "due" or "accruing due" on July 20, 2010. On that date, Indalex was not required under the PBA or the Regulations thereunder to pay any amount into the [Salaried] Plan. There was an annual payment that would have become payable as at December 31, 2009 but for the stay provided for in the Initial Order under the CCAA.
[50] Since as of July 20, 2009, there was no amount due or payable, no deemed trust arose in respect of the remaining deficiency arising as at the date of wind-up.
[51] Since under the initial order priority was given to the DIP Lenders, they are entitled to be repaid the amounts currently held in escrow. Those entitled to windup deficiency remain as of that date unsecured creditors.
The Indalex Bankruptcy Motion
[74] Having found that the deemed trust claims failed, the CCAA judge considered that the question of Indalex’s assignment into bankruptcy might be moot. He went on, in para. 55 of his reasons for decision, to state:
[55] … In my view, a voluntary assignment under the BIA should not be used to defeat a secured claim under valid Provincial legislation, unless the Provincial legislation is in direct conflict with the provisions of Federal Insolvency Legislation such as the CCAA or the BIA. For that reason I did not entertain the bankruptcy assignment motion first. [Emphasis added.]
[75] He found no conflict between the federal and provincial legislative regimes and allowed the Applicants to renew their request for bankruptcy relief in a further motion.
[76] The central issue raised on these appeals is whether the CCAA judge erred in his interpretation of s. 57(4) of the PBA and, specifically, in finding that no deemed trust existed with respect to the Deficiencies as at July 20, 2009.
[77] The USW and the Former Executives ask the court to decide a second issue: whether during the CCAA proceedings Indalex breached the fiduciary obligations that it owed to the Plans’ beneficiaries by virtue of being the Plans’ administrator.[2]
[78] The U.S. Trustee’s submission raises two additional issues. Does the collateral attack rule bar the appellants’ deemed trust motions? Do the principles of cross-border insolvencies apply to these appeals?
[79] The final issue that arises is that of remedy: how is the Reserve Fund to be distributed?
[80] Given the centrality of the wind up process to these appeals, I will briefly outline the salient aspects of the wind up process before turning to a consideration of each of these issues.
[81] To understand the wind up process, one must first understand how the pension plan operates while it is ongoing.
[82] A pension plan to which the employees contribute is called a contributory plan. In the case of contributory plans, the employer is obliged to remit the employee contributions, including payroll deductions, within a specified time frame. This aspect of an employer’s obligations does not arise in these appeals.
[83] In addition to remitting the employee contributions, if any, while a defined benefit pension plan is ongoing, the employer must make two types of contributions to ensure that the plan is adequately funded and capable of paying the promised pension benefits.
1. Current service or “normal cost” contributions – the employer contributions necessary to pay for current service costs in respect of benefits that are currently accruing to members as a result of their ongoing participation in the plan as active employees. These must be made in monthly instalments within 30 days after the month to which they relate.
2. Special payments – a plan administrator must file an actuarial report annually in which the pension plan is valued on two different bases: a “going-concern” basis, where it is assumed the plan will continue to operate indefinitely; and a “solvency” basis, where it is assumed that the employer will discontinue its business and wind up its plan. If the actuarial report discloses a going-concern liability, the employer is required to make monthly special payments over a 15 year period to fund the unfunded liability. If the actuarial report discloses a solvency deficiency, the employer is required to make monthly special payments over a 5 year period to fund the deficiency.
[84] It is important to understand that the solvency valuation is not the same thing as a wind up report. To repeat, the solvency valuation is prepared while the pension plan is ongoing. A solvency valuation is required while the plan is ongoing because it is crucial that there be adequate funds with which to pay pensions if the company becomes insolvent and the plan is wound up.
[85] The wind up of a pension plan is defined in the PBA as “the termination of the pension plan and the distribution of the assets of the pension fund” (s. 1(1)). At the effective date of wind up, the plan members cease to accrue further entitlements under the plan. Naturally, no new members may join the plan after the wind up date. The pension fund of a plan that is wound up continues to be subject to the PBA and the Regulations until all of the assets of the fund have been disbursed (s. 76).
[86] Winding up a pension plan must be distinguished from closing the plan, which simply means that no new entrants are permitted to join the plan.
[87] Under the PBA, there are two ways that a pension plan can be wound up. First, s. 68(1) recognizes that an employer[3] can voluntarily wind up the pension plan. Second, under s. 69(1), in certain circumstances, the Superintendent may order the wind up of the plan.
[88] The PBA contains a detailed statutory scheme that must be followed when a pension plan is to be wound up. This scheme imposes obligations on the employer and plan administrator, including the following:
- The administrator has to give written notice of proposal to wind up to various people, including the Superintendent, and the notice must contain specified information (s. 68(2) and (4));
- A wind up date must be chosen and the administrator must file a wind up report showing, among other things, the plan’s assets and liabilities as at that date (s. 70(1));
- No payments can be made out of the pension fund until the Superintendent has approved the wind up report (s. 70(4));
- Plan members with a certain combination of age and years of service or membership in the plan are entitled to additional benefits on wind up (grow-ins) (s. 74).
[89] Importantly, s. 75 requires an employer to make two different categories of payment on plan wind up. Sections 75(1)(a) and (b) read as follows:
Liability of employer on wind up
75. (1) Where a pension plan is wound up in whole or in part, the employer shall pay into the pension fund,
(a) |
an amount equal to the total of all payments that, under this Act, the regulations and the pension plan, are due or that have accrued and that have not been paid into the pension fund; and |
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(b) |
an amount equal to the amount by which, |
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(i) |
the value of the pension benefits under the pension plan that would be guaranteed by the Guarantee Fund under this Act and the regulations if the Superintendent declares that the Guarantee Fund applies to the pension plan, |
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(ii) |
the value of the pension benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario vested under the pension plan, and |
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(iii) |
the value of benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario resulting from the application of subsection 39 (3) (50 per cent rule) and section 74, |
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exceed the value of the assets of the pension fund allocated as prescribed for payment of pension benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario. |
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[90] Section 75(1)(a) requires the employer to make all payments that are due immediately or that have accrued and not been paid into the pension fund. Any unpaid current service costs and unpaid special payments are caught by this subsection. In other words, by virtue of this subsection, any payments that the employer had to make while the plan was ongoing must be paid. It will be recalled that while the plan was ongoing, some special payments could be made over time.
[91] Section 75(1)(b) requires the employer to pay additional amounts into the pension fund if there are insufficient assets to cover the value of the pension benefits in the three categories set out in s. 75(1)(b).
[92] It will be apparent that on wind up, an employer will often be faced with having to make significant additional contributions under s. 75(1)(b), in addition to being required to bring all contributions up to date because of s. 75(1)(a). Section 75(2) stipulates that “the employer shall pay the money due under subsection (1) in the prescribed manner and at the prescribed times.” Section 31 of the Regulations prescribes the manner and timing for the s. 75 wind up payments. It provides that the amounts an employer is to contribute under section 75 shall be by annual special payments, commencing at the effective date of the wind up, over not more than five years.
[93] The central issue in these appeals is whether the CCAA judge erred in his interpretation of s. 57(4) of the PBA. Section 57(4) reads as follows:
57. (4) Where a pension plan is wound up in whole or in part, an employer who is required to pay contributions to the pension fund shall be deemed to hold in trust for the beneficiaries of the pension plan an amount of money equal to employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due under the plan or regulations. [emphasis added]
[94] The modern approach to statutory construction dictates that in interpreting s. 57(4), the words must be read
in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.[4]
[95] Section 57(4) deems an employer to hold in trust an amount equal to the contributions “accrued to the date of wind up but not yet due under the plan or regulations”. The question is: what employer contributions are caught by s. 57(4) and, thus, are subject to the deemed trust?
[96] The introductory words of s. 57(4) refer to where a pension plan is “wound up”. Therefore, to answer this question, one must refer to the wind up regime created by the PBA and Regulations, a summary of which is set out above.
[97] It will be recalled that when a pension plan is wound up, an actuarial calculation is made of the assets and liabilities, as of the wind up date. Because the plan liabilities relate to service that was provided up to the wind up date and not beyond, it is clear that all plan liabilities are accrued as of the wind up date. Put another way, no additional liability can accrue following the wind up because all events crystallize on the windup date – all pension benefit accruals by members cease and all amounts that an employer is required to pay into a pension plan are calculated as of the wind up date. For the same reason, the amounts that s. 75 requires an employer to contribute to the pension fund, on wind up, are accrued to the date of wind up. The required contributions are the amounts that an employer must make to the pension fund so that the accrued pension benefits of the plan members can be paid.
[98] It will be further recalled that s. 31 of the Regulations gives the employer up to five years in which to make all of the required s. 75 contributions. However, the fact that an employer is given time in which to pay the requisite contributions into the pension fund does not change the fact that the liabilities accrued by the wind up date.
[99] This point is reinforced when one distinguishes amounts that are “accrued” from amounts that are “not yet due”. In Hydro-Electric Power Commission (Ontario) v. Albright (1922), 64 S.C.R. 306, at para. 23, the Supreme Court of Canada explains that money is “due” when there is a legal obligation to pay it, whereas payments are “accrued” when the rights or obligations are constituted and the liability to pay exists, even if the payment does not need to be made until a later date (i.e. is not “due” until a later date).
[100] Thus, just as s. 57(4) contemplates, while the amounts that the employer must contribute to the pension fund pursuant to s. 75 “accrued to the date of wind up”, because of s. 31 those contributions are “not yet due under the … regulations”.
[101] There is nothing in the wording of s. 57(4) to suggest that its scope is confined to the amounts payable under only s. 75(1)(a), as the respondents contend. On the contrary, the words of s. 57(4), given their grammatical and ordinary meaning, contemplate that all amounts owing to the pension plan on wind up are subject to the deemed trust, even if those amounts are not yet due under the plan or regulations. Therefore, the deemed trust in s. 57(4) applies to all employer contributions that are required to be made pursuant to s. 75. In short, the words “employer contributions accrued to the date of wind up but not yet due” in s. 57(4) include all amounts owed by the employer on the wind up of its pension plan.
[102] This interpretation accords with a contextual analysis of s. 57(4).
[103] As these appeals demonstrate, during the five-year “grace” period permitted by s. 31 of the Regulations, the rights of plan beneficiaries are at risk. Sections 57(4) and (5) provide some protection to the plan beneficiaries during that period. The employees’ interest is in receiving their full pension entitlements. For that to happen, all s. 75 employer contributions must be made into the pension fund. The employer, on the other hand, has an interest in having a reasonable period of time within which to make the requisite s. 75 contributions. Section 31 of the Regulations gives the employer up to five years to make the contributions, during which time the deemed trust in s. 57(4) and the lien and charge in s. 57(5) provide a measure of protection for the employees over the amount of the unpaid employer contributions, contributions that had accrued to the date of wind up but [were] not yet due under the regulations.
[104] Further, this interpretation is consistent with the overall purpose of the PBA, which is to establish minimum standards,[5] safeguard the rights of pension plan beneficiaries,[6] and ensure the solvency of pension plans so that pension promises will be fulfilled.[7] As the Supreme Court of Canada said in Monsanto, at para. 38:
The Act is public policy legislation that recognizes the vital importance of long-term income security. As a legislative intervention in the administration of voluntary pension plans, its purpose is to establish minimum standards and regulatory supervision in order to protect and safeguard the pension benefits and rights of members, former members and others entitled to receive benefits under private pension plans (citations omitted).
[105] Much reference has been made to the two cases in which s. 57(4) has been discussed: Re Ivaco (2005), 12 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. S.C.), aff’d (2006), 83 O.R. (3d) 108 (C.A.), and Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Usarco (1991), 42 E.T.R. 235 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)). In my view, these decisions are of little assistance in deciding this issue.
[106] Factually, Ivaco and Usarco differ from the present case. In Ivaco and Usarco, the prospect of bankruptcy was firmly before the court whereas in this case, at its highest, there is a motion to lift the stay and file for bankruptcy.
[107] Moreover, there are conflicting statements in Ivaco and Usarco regarding the applicability of the deemed trust to wind up deficiencies. In Usarco, a bankruptcy petition had been filed but no steps had been taken to proceed with the petition. The company was not under CCAA protection. In that context, Farley J., the motion judge, held that the deemed trust provision referred only to the regular contributions together with special contributions that were to have been made but had not been.[8] In Ivaco, the major financers and creditors wished to have the CCAA proceeding, which was functioning as a liquidation, transformed into a bankruptcy proceeding. The case was focused primarily on whether there was a reason to defeat the bankruptcy petition. In Ivaco, Farley J. took a different view of the scope of the s. 57(4) deemed trust, stating that in a non-bankruptcy situation, the company’s assets were subject to a deemed trust on account of unpaid contributions and wind up liabilities.[9] On appeal, although this court indicated that it thought that Farley J.’s statement in Usarco was correct, it found it unnecessary to decide the matter. Accordingly, these decisions are not determinative of the scope of the deemed trust created by s. 57(4) of the PBA.
[108] The CCAA judge concluded that because Indalex had made the going-concern and special payments to the Salaried Plan at the date of closing, there were no amounts due to the Salaried Plan. Therefore, there could be no deemed trust. Respectfully, I disagree. As I have explained, the deemed trust in s. 57(4) is not limited to the payment of amounts contemplated by s. 75(1)(a). It applies to all payments required by s. 75(1), including payments mandated by s. 75(1)(b).
[109] Accordingly, the deficiency in the Salaried Plan had accrued as of the date of wind up (December 31, 2006) and, pursuant to s. 57(4) of the PBA, was subject to a deemed trust. The CCAA judge erred in holding that no deemed trust existed with respect to that deficiency as at July 20, 2009. The consequences that flow from this conclusion are explored in the section below on how the Reserve Fund is to be distributed.
[110] Are the unpaid liability payments owing to the Executive Plan also subject to the s. 57(4) deemed trust? The Former Executives, Superintendent and Morneau all contend that they are. On the plain wording of s. 57(4), I find it difficult to accept this argument – the introductory words of the provision speak to “where a pension plan is wound up”. In other words, wind up of the pension plan appears to be a requirement for s. 57(4) to apply. If that is so, no deemed trust could arise unless and until a plan wind up occurred. As has been noted, the Executive Plan had not been wound up at the relevant time.
[111] Having said this, I am troubled by the notion that Indalex can rely on its own inaction to avoid the consequences that flow from wind up. In its letter of July 13, 2009, counsel for the Monitor confirmed that the Executive Plan would be wound up. Indeed, the CCAA judge acknowledged that the material filed with the court showed an intention on the part of the Applicants to wind up the plan. If the deemed trust does not extend to the Executive Plan, in the circumstances of this case, it appears that the result would be a triumph of form over substance.
[112] In the end, however, the question that drives these appeals is whether the Monitor should be directed to distribute the Reserve Fund to the Plans. As I explain below in the section on how the Reserve Fund should be distributed, in my view, such an order should be made. Consequently, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether the deemed trust applies to the deficiency in the Executive Plan and I decline to do so. It is a question that is best decided in a case where the result depends on it and a fuller record would enable the court to appreciate the broader implications of such a determination.
DID INDALEX BREACH ITS FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION?
[113] The appellants say that Indalex, as administrator of the Plans, owed a fiduciary duty to the Plans’ members and beneficiaries. Both appellants list a number of actions that Indalex took or failed to take during the CCAA proceedings that they say amounted to breaches of its fiduciary obligation. They contend that the appropriate remedy for those breaches is an order requiring the Reserve Fund to be paid into the Plans.
[114] The Monitor acknowledges that pension plan administrators have both a statutory and common law duty to act in the best interests of the plan beneficiaries and to avoid conflicts of interest, and that these duties are “fiduciary in nature”. However, the Monitor contends that Indalex took all of the impugned actions in its role as employer and, therefore, could not have breached the fiduciary duties it owed to the Plans’ beneficiaries as administrator. In any event, the Monitor adds, the issue is moot because any such breaches would merely give rise to an unsecured claim outside the ambit of the deemed trusts created by the PBA.
[115] Sun Indalex echoes the Monitor’s latter argument and says that the allegations of breach of fiduciary duty are irrelevant in these appeals. Its submission on this issue is summarized in para. 79 of its factum:
[79] There is no provision in the PBA that creates a deemed trust in respect of any claim for damages based on an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by an employer and there is no basis in the PBA for conferring a priority with respect to such a claim. If a claim for breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Indalex exists, it is merely an unsecured claim outside the ambit of the deemed trusts created by the PBA that does not have priority over Sun’s secured claim or the super-priority DIP Lenders Charge.
[116] For the reasons that follow, I accept the appellants’ submission that Indalex breached its fiduciary obligations as administrator during the CCAA proceedings. I deal with the question of what flows from that finding when deciding the issue of remedy.
[117] It is clear that the administrator of a pension plan is subject to fiduciary obligations in respect of the plan members and beneficiaries.[10] These obligations arise both at common law and by virtue of s. 22 of the PBA.
[118] The common law governing fiduciary relationships is well known. A fiduciary relationship will be held to exist where, given all the surrounding circumstances, one person could reasonably have expected that the other person in the relationship would act in the former’s best interests.[11] The key factual characteristics of a fiduciary relationship are: the scope for the exercise of discretion or power; the ability to exercise that power unilaterally so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests; and, a peculiar vulnerability on the part of the beneficiary to the exercise of that discretion or power.[12]
[119] It is readily apparent that these characteristics exist in the relationship between the pension plan administrator and the plan members and beneficiaries. The administrator has the power to unilaterally make decisions that affect the interests of plan members and beneficiaries as a result of its responsibility for the administration of the plan and management of the fund. Those decisions affect the beneficiaries’ interests. The plan members and beneficiaries reasonably rely on the administrator to ensure that the plan and fund are properly administered. And, as these appeals demonstrate, they are peculiarly vulnerable to the administrator’s exercise of its powers. Thus, at common law, Indalex as the Plans’ administrator owed a fiduciary duty to the Plans’ members and beneficiaries to act in their best interests.
[120] Section 22 of the PBA also imposes a fiduciary duty on the administrator in the administration of the plan and fund. As well, it expressly prohibits the administrator from knowingly permitting its interest to conflict with its duties in respect of the pension fund. The relevant provisions in s. 22 read as follows:
Care, diligence and skill
22. (1) The administrator of a pension plan shall exercise the care, diligence and skill in the administration and investment of the pension fund that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another person.
Special knowledge and skill
(2) The administrator of a pension plan shall use in the administration of the pension plan and in the administration and investment of the pension fund all relevant knowledge and skill that the administrator possesses or, by reason of the administrator’s profession, business or calling, ought to possess.
…
Conflict of interest
(4) An administrator … shall not knowingly permit the administrator’s interest to conflict with the administrator’s duties and powers in respect of the pension fund.
[121] In Ontario, an employer is expressly permitted to act as the administrator of its pension plan: see ss. 1 and 8 of the PBA.[13] It is self-evident that the two roles can conflict from time to time. In Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions) (1995), 18 C.C.P.B. 198 (Imperial Oil), the Pension Commission of Ontario (PCO) grappled with this statutorily sanctioned conflict in roles.
[122] In that case, the employer Imperial Oil was the administrator of two employee pension plans. Imperial Oil sought to file amendments to the pension plans with the PCO. Prior to the amendments, a plan member with 10 or more years of service with Imperial Oil whose employment was terminated for efficiency reasons was entitled to an enhanced early retirement annuity (the enhanced benefit). The effect of the amendments was to deny such an employee the enhanced benefit unless the employee would have been able to retire within five years of termination. Put another way, after the amendments, in addition to the other requirements, an employee had to be 50 years of age or older at the time his or her employment was terminated for efficiency reasons in order to receive the enhanced benefit.
[123] The Superintendent accepted the amendments for registration.
[124] Some six months after the amendments were passed, Imperial Oil terminated the employment of a large number of employees for efficiency reasons. A number of the affected employees had 10 or more years of service but, because they had not reached the age of 50, they were denied the enhanced benefit.
[125] A group of former employees (the Entitlement 55 Group) objected to the registration of the amendments. They brought an application to the PCO, seeking a declaration that the amendments were void and an order compelling Imperial Oil to administer the pension plans according to the terms of the plans in place before the amendments were passed.
[126] Among other things, the Entitlement 55 Group argued that when Imperial Oil amended the plans, it was acting in both its capacity as employer and its capacity as administrator of the plans. Thus, they contended, Imperial Oil placed itself in a conflict of interest situation prohibited by s. 22(4) of the PBA because in its role as employer it wished to reduce pension fund liabilities but in its role as administrator it had a duty to protect the interests of the beneficiaries who had reached the 10 year service qualification and thereby “qualified” for the enhanced benefit.
[127] The PCO dismissed the application. In so doing, it rejected the submission that Imperial Oil had contravened s. 22(4) by passing the amendments. It held that Imperial Oil had acted solely in its capacity as employer when it passed the amendments.
[128] The PCO acknowledged that the PBA allows an employer to wear “two hats” – one as employer and the other as administrator. However, at para. 33 of its reasons, the PCO explained that an employer plays a role in respect of the pension plan that is distinct from its role as administrator:
Its role as employer permits it to make the decision to create a pension plan, to amend it and to wind it up. Once the plan and fund are in place, it becomes an administrator for the purposes of management of the fund and administration of the plan. If we were to hold that an employer was an administrator for all purposes once a plan was established, of what use would a power of amendment be? An employer could never use the power to amend the plan in a way that was to its benefit, as opposed to the benefit of the employees. Section 14 presupposes this power is with an employer as it created parameters around the exercise of a power of amendment.
[129] The “two hats” analogy in Imperial Oil assists in understanding the parameters of the dual roles of an employer who is also the administrator of its pension plan. The employer, when managing its business, wears its corporate hat. Although the employer qua corporation must treat all stakeholders fairly when their interests conflict, the directors’ ultimate duty is to act in the best interests of the corporation: see BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, at paras. 81-84. On the other hand, when acting as the pension plan administrator, the employer wears its fiduciary hat and must act in the best interests of the plan’s members and beneficiaries.
[130] The question raised by these appeals is whether, as the respondents contend, Indalex wore only its corporate hat during the CCAA proceedings. In my view, it did not. As I will explain, during the CCAA proceedings, in the unique circumstances of this case, Indalex wore both its corporate and its administrator’s hats.
[131] I begin from the position that Indalex had the right to make the decision to commence CCAA proceedings wearing solely its corporate hat. That decision is not part of the administration of the pension plan or fund nor does it necessarily engage the rights of the beneficiaries of the pension plan. For example, an employer might sell its business under CCAA protection, with the purchaser agreeing to continue the pension plan. In that situation, there should be no effect on the payment of pension benefits. Similarly, if the pension plan were fully funded, CCAA proceedings should have no effect on pension entitlements.
[132] However, just because the initial decision to commence CCAA proceedings is solely a corporate one that does not mean that all subsequent decisions made during the proceedings are also solely corporate ones. In the circumstances of this case, Indalex could not simply ignore its obligations as the Plans’ administrator once it decided to seek CCAA protection. Shortly after initiating CCAA proceedings, Indalex moved to obtain DIP financing, in which it agreed to give the DIP lenders a super-priority charge. At the same time, Indalex knew that the Plans were underfunded and that unless more funds were put into the Plans, pensions would have to be reduced. The decisions that Indalex was unilaterally making had the potential to affect the Plans beneficiaries’ rights, at a time when they were particularly vulnerable. The peculiar vulnerability of pension plan beneficiaries was even greater than in the ordinary course because they were given no notice of the CCAA proceedings, had no real knowledge of what was transpiring and had no power to ensure that their interests were even considered – much less protected – during the DIP negotiations.
[133] In concluding that Indalex was subject to its fiduciary duties as administrator as well as its corporate obligations during the CCAA proceedings, two points need to be made.
[134] First, it is significant that Indalex is unclear as to what it thinks happened to its role as administrator during the CCAA proceedings. When cross-examined on this matter, Mr. Cooper gave various responses as to whom he believed filled that role: Indalex, a combination of him and the Monitor, and a combination of him and his staff. This confusion is understandable, given the number of roles that Mr. Cooper played in these proceedings. It will be recalled that prior to the commencement of the CCAA proceedings, he became the Chief Restructuring Officer for Indalex U.S., a position which included responsibility for the Canadian group of Indalex companies. In this position, he served as Indalex’s primary negotiator of the DIP credit agreement. But, at the same time, he worked for FTI Consulting Inc. The Monitor is a wholly-owned subsidiary of FTI Consulting Inc. This blending of roles no doubt contributed to the apparent disregard for the obligations owed by the Plans’ administrator.
[135] In any event, it is not apparent to me that Indalex could ignore its role as administrator or divest itself of those obligations without taking formal steps through the Superintendent, plan amendment, the courts, or some combination thereof, to transfer that role to a suitable person. However, I will not consider this particular question further because it was not squarely raised and argued by the parties and, in any event, even if Mr. Cooper became the administrator, through his various roles, including as Chief Restructuring Officer for Indalex U.S., he is so clearly allied in interest with Indalex that the following analysis remains applicable.
[136] Second, the respondents’ submission that Indalex wore only its corporate hat during the proceedings is implicitly premised on the notion that an employer will wear its corporate hat or its administrator’s hat, but never both. I do not accept this premise. Nor do I accept that the reasoning in Imperial Oil, which the respondents rely on, supports this submission.
[137] In Imperial Oil, the PCO had to decide whether certain acts taken in respect of a pension plan were those of the employer or the administrator. Because the provision of pension plans is voluntary in Canada, the employer has the right to decide questions of plan design, including whether to offer a pension plan and, if it does, whether to end it. In part because of the wording of s. 14 of the PBA and in part because the amendments at issue in Imperial Oil were a matter of plan design, the PCO concluded that the employer was found to be acting solely in its corporate role when it passed the amendments. There is nothing in Imperial Oil to suggest that an employer cannot find itself in a position where it is wearing both hats at the same time.
[138] I turn next to the question of breach.
[139] As previously noted, when Indalex commenced CCAA proceedings, it knew that the Plans were underfunded and that unless additional funds were put into the Plans, pensions would be reduced. Indalex did nothing in the CCAA proceedings to fund the deficit in the underfunded Plans. It took no steps to protect the vested rights of the Plans’ beneficiaries to continue to receive their full pension entitlements. In fact, Indalex took active steps which undermined the possibility of additional funding to the Plans. It applied for CCAA protection without notice to the Plans’ beneficiaries. It obtained a CCAA order that gave priority to the DIP lenders over “statutory trusts” without notice to the Plans’ beneficiaries. It sold its assets without making any provision for the Plans. It knew the purchaser was not taking over the Plans.[14] It moved to obtain orders approving the sale and distributing the sale proceeds to the DIP lenders, knowing that no payment would be made to the underfunded Plans. And, Indalex U.S. directed Indalex to bring its bankruptcy motion with the intention of defeating the deemed trust claims and ensuring that the Reserve Fund was transferred to it. In short, Indalex did nothing to protect the best interests of the Plans’ beneficiaries and, accordingly, was in breach of its fiduciary obligations as administrator.
[140] Further, in my view, Indalex was in a conflict of interest position. As has been mentioned, Indalex’s corporate duty was to treat all stakeholders fairly when their interests conflicted, but its ultimate duty was to act in the best interests of the corporation. Indalex’s duty as administrator was to act in the Plans’ beneficiaries best interests. It is apparent that in the circumstances of this case, these duties were in conflict.
[141] The common law prohibition against conflict of interest is not confined to situations where the fiduciary’s personal interest conflicts with those of the beneficiaries. It also precludes the fiduciary from placing itself in a position where it acts for two parties who are adverse in interest: Davey v. Woolley, Hames, Dale & Dingwall (1982), 35 O.R. (2nd) 599 (C.A.), at para. 8. In Davey, a solicitor who acted for both sides of a business transaction was found to be in breach of his fiduciary obligations. Wilson J.A., writing for this court, explained that the conflict arose because the solicitor could not fulfill his duties in respect of both clients at the same time. At para. 18, she concluded that the solicitor was bound to refuse to act for the plaintiff in the circumstances.
[142] The prohibition against a fiduciary being in a position of conflicting duties governs the situation in which Indalex found itself in during the CCAA proceedings.
[143] Indalex was not at liberty to resolve the conflict in its duties by simply ignoring its role as administrator. A fiduciary relationship does not end simply because it becomes impossible of performance. At the point where its duty to the corporation conflicted with its duties as administrator, it was incumbent on Indalex to take steps to address the conflict.
[144] Even if I am in error in concluding that Indalex was in breach of its common law fiduciary obligations, I would find that its actions amounted to a breach of s. 22(4) of the PBA. Section 22(4) prohibits an administrator from knowingly permitting its interest to conflict with its duties and powers in respect of the pension fund. Under s. 57(5) of the PBA, as administrator, Indalex had a lien and charge on its assets for the amount of the deemed trust. Any steps that it might have taken pursuant to s. 57(5), as administrator, would have been in respect of the pension fund. Thus, if nothing else, Indalex’s actions during the CCAA proceedings demonstrate that it permitted its corporate interests to conflict with the administrator’s duties and powers that flow from the lien and charge.
[145] Having found that Indalex breached its fiduciary obligations to the Plans’ beneficiaries, the question becomes: what flows from such a finding? I address that question below when considering the issue of how to distribute the Reserve Fund. At that time I will return to the arguments of the Monitor and Sun Indalex to the effect that such a finding is largely irrelevant in these proceedings.
[146] The U.S. Trustee submits that even if the PBA creates a deemed trust for any wind up deficiencies in the Plans, the appeals should be dismissed because the underlying motions are an impermissible collateral attack on previous orders made in the CCAA proceedings. His argument runs as follows.
[147] The Initial Order, the June 12, 2009 order and the Sale Approval order (the “Court Orders”) are all valid, enforceable court orders. The Court Orders gave super-priority rights to the DIP lenders and Indalex U.S. is subrogated to those rights. None of the Court Orders were appealed and no party sought to have them set aside or varied. As the appellants’ motions seek to alter the priorities established by the Court Orders, they should be barred because they are an impermissible collateral attack on those orders.
[148] I do not accept this submission for three reasons, the first two of which can be shortly stated.
[149] First, this submission is an attack on the underlying motions. As such, it ought to have been raised below. The Former Executives say that the collateral attack doctrine was raised for the first time on appeal. Certainly, if it was raised below, the CCAA judge makes no reference to it. As a general rule, it is not appropriate to raise an issue for the first time on appeal. The exceptions to this general rule are very limited and do not apply in this case: see Cusson v. Quan, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 712, at paras. 36-37.
[150] Second, the USW and the Former Executives raised the matter of the deemed trusts in the CCAA proceedings. The CCAA judge designed a process by which their claims would be resolved. They followed that process. The USW and Former Executives can scarcely be faulted for complying with a court-designed process. Further, the Sale Approval order acknowledged the deemed trust issue in that it required the Monitor to hold funds in reserve that were sufficient to satisfy the deemed trust claims. That acknowledgment is inconsistent with a subsequent claim of impermissible collateral attack.
[151] Third, as I will now explain, an appreciation of the CCAA regime makes it apparent that the collateral attack rule does not apply in the circumstances of this case.
[152] The collateral attack rule rests on the need for court orders to be treated as binding and conclusive unless they are set aside on appeal or lawfully quashed. Court orders may not be attacked collaterally. That is, a court order may not be attacked in proceedings other than those whose specific object is the reversal, variation, or nullification of the order. See Wilson v. The Queen, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 594, at para. 8.
[153] The fundamental policy behind the rule against collateral attacks is “to maintain the rule of law and to preserve the repute of the administration of justice”: see R. v. Litchfield, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 333, at para. 22. If a party could avoid the consequences of an order issued against it by going to another forum, this would undermine the integrity of the justice system. Consequently, the doctrine is intended to prevent a party from circumventing the effect of a decision rendered against it: see Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co., [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629, at para. 72.
[154] The CCAA regime is designed to deal with all matters during an insolvent company’s attempt to reorganize. The court-ordered stay of proceedings ensures that there is only one forum where parties can put forth their arguments and claims. By pre-empting other legal proceedings, the stay gives a corporation breathing space, which promotes the opportunity for reorganization.
[155] The CCAA regime is a flexible, judicially supervised reorganization process that allows for creative and effective decisions: see Century Services Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] 3 S.C.R. 379, at para. 21. The CCAA judge is accorded broad discretion because the proceedings are a fact-based exercise that requires ongoing monitoring and because there is often a need for the court to act quickly. There is an underlying assumption, however, that the CCAA proceedings will provide an opportunity for affected persons to participate in the proceedings.
[156] This assumption finds voice in para. 56 of the Initial Order, as amended, which permits any interested party to apply to the CCAA court to vary or amend the Initial Order (the come-back clause). That is precisely what the appellants did. As interested parties, they went to the CCAA court to ask that the super-priority charge be varied or amended so that their claims could be properly recognised.
[157] Moreover, I do not accept that the appellants failed to act promptly in asserting their claims. It was only when Indalex brought a motion for approval of the sale of its assets to SAPA and for a distribution of the sale proceeds to the DIP lenders that it became clear that Indalex intended to abandon the Plans in their underfunded states. The appellants immediately took steps to assert their claims in the very forum in which all of the Court Orders had been made, namely, the CCAA court.
[158] The U.S. Trustee’s argument that the Court Orders were never appealed is not persuasive. In Algoma Steel Inc. Re (2001), 147 O.A.C. 291, at paras. 7-9, this court stated that it is premature to grant leave to appeal from an initial order – brought on an urgent basis to deal with seemingly desperate circumstances – when the order specifically opens the proceeding to all interested parties and invites dissatisfied parties to bring their concerns to the court on a timely basis using a come-back provision.
[159] As the Former Executives point out, had the appellants sought to advance their deemed trust claims by bringing a motion challenging the paragraph of the Initial Order that established the DIP super-priority charge, it is likely that they would have been met by a response that their motions were premature. Depending on the amount paid for the company and/or the arrangements made in respect of the Plans, the interests of the Plans’ beneficiaries might not have been affected by a sale. Indeed, on July 2, 2009, when Indalex brought a motion to have the bidding procedures approved for the asset sale and the Former Executives objected because of concerns that the Plans were underfunded, the CCAA judge endorsed the record as follows: “The issues can be raised by the retirees on any application to approve a transaction – but that is for another day.”
[160] The appellants followed that direction. When Indalex moved to have the sale transaction approved and the jeopardy to the appellants’ interests became apparent, they went to the CCAA court and raised the deemed trust issue.[15]
[161] Thus, as I have said, I do not view the deemed trust motions as collateral attacks on the Court Orders. The motions were raised in a timely manner in the same court in which the orders were made. They can scarcely be termed attempts to circumvent decisions rendered against the USW and the Former Executives when no decision had ever been rendered in which their claims had been squarely raised and addressed. The process the USW and the Former Executives followed is exactly that which is contemplated in CCAA proceedings and, specifically, the come-back clause.
[162] Even if the collateral attack rule were applicable, however, this is not a case for its strict application.
[163] In Litchfield, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that there will be situations in which the collateral attack rule should not be strictly applied. In that case, a physician had been charged with a number of counts of sexual assault on his patients. On motion, a judge (not the trial judge) ordered that the counts be severed and divided and three different trials be held. After one trial, the physician was acquitted. The Crown appealed. One of the grounds of appeal related to the pre-trial severance order. The question arose as to whether the Crown’s challenge to the validity of the severance order violated the collateral attack rule.
[164] At paras. 16-19 of Litchfield, Iacobucci J., writing for the majority, explains that “some flexibility” is needed in the application of the rule against collateral attacks. Strictly applied, the rule would prevent the trial judge from reviewing the severance order because the trial was not a proceeding whose specific object was the reversal, variation or nullification of the severance order. However, Iacobucci J. noted, the rule is not intended to immunize court orders from review. He reiterated the powerful rationale behind the rule: to maintain the rule of law and preserve the repute of the administration of justice. This promotes certainty and finality, key aspects of the orderly and functional administration of justice. However, he concluded that flexibility was warranted because permitting a collateral attack on the severance order did not offend the underlying rationale for the rule.
[165] Similarly, in R. v. Domm (1996), 31 O.R. (3d) 540, at para. 31, Doherty J.A., writing for this court, states that if a collateral attack can be taken without harm to the interests of the rule of law and the repute of the administration of justice, the rule should be relaxed. At para. 36 of Domm, he says that the rule must yield where a person has “no other effective means” of challenging the order in question.
[166] I acknowledge that certainty and finality are necessary to the proper functioning of the legal system. And, I recognize that permitting the appellants’ motions to proceed has generated some degree of uncertainty as to the priorities established by the Court Orders. However, in the circumstances of this case, there was no other effective means by which the appellants could assert their claims to a deemed trust. As has been mentioned, it was only when Indalex brought a motion for approval of the sale of its assets to SAPA and for a distribution of the sale proceeds to the DIP lenders that it became clear that Indalex intended to abandon the Plans in their underfunded states. The appellants immediately took steps to assert their claims in the very forum in which all of the Court Orders had been made, namely, the CCAA court. By permitting their motions to be heard, the CCAA judge did not damage the repute of the administration of justice. On the contrary, he strengthened it. He enabled the sale to proceed while ensuring that the competing claims to the Reserve Fund would be decided on the merits and expeditiously.
[167] Nor can it be said, for the reasons already given about the nature of CCAA proceedings, that the deemed trust motions jeopardize the rule of law. Given the nature of a CCAA proceeding, the court must often make orders on an urgent and expedited basis, with little or no notice to creditors and other interested parties. Its processes are sufficiently flexible that it can accommodate situations such as the one that arose here. A strict application of the rule would preclude the appellants from having the opportunity to meaningfully challenge the super-priority charge in the Initial Order, as amended. In my view, that result would be a fundamental flaw in the CCAA process, one in which procedure triumphed over substance. As Iacobucci J. said in Litchfield, at para. 18, such a result cannot be accepted.
[168] Accordingly, in my view, while the collateral attack rule does not apply, even if it did, there are compelling reasons in this case to relax its strict application.
[169] The U.S. Trustee also submits that the principles of cross-border insolvencies should be applied when deciding these appeals. He contends that notwithstanding that separate proceedings were commenced in Canada and the U.S., those principles apply because the Applicants were direct and indirect subsidiaries of certain of the U.S. debtors, who commenced proceedings under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in March 2009. Further, the U.S. Trustee contends that if the appellants’ claims were to succeed, it would seriously undermine the basic principles underlying cross-border insolvencies and the confidence of foreign creditors and courts in the Canadian insolvency system.
[170] While this argument provides context for the U.S. Trustee’s collateral attack submission, I do not see it as disclosing any legal grounds relevant to these appeals. By order dated May 12, 2009, Morawetz J. approved a cross-border protocol in these proceedings that stipulates that the U.S. and Canadian courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings in their respective jurisdictions. Furthermore, there is no evidence to support the U.S. Trustee’s claim that allowing these appeals would impair future lending practices by U.S. companies. Finally, nothing has been raised which supports the notion that upholding valid provincial law in the circumstances of these appeals will undermine the principles of cross-border insolvencies.
HOW IS THE RESERVE FUND TO BE DISTRIBUTED?
The Salaried Plan
[171] Having concluded that a deemed trust exists with respect to the deficiency in the Salaried Plan as at July 20, 2009, the question becomes whether the Monitor should be ordered to pay the amount of that deficiency, from the Reserve Fund, into the Salaried Plan.
[172] The USW argues, on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Salaried Plan, that the deemed trust ranks in priority to all secured creditors and, therefore, the order should be made. Its argument rests on s. 30(7) of the PPSA, which reads as follows:
30. (7) A security interest in an account or inventory and its proceeds is subordinate to the interest of a person who is the beneficiary of a deemed trust arising under the Employment Standards Act or under the Pension Benefits Act. [emphasis added]
[173] The USW contends that as s. 30(7) gives priority to the PBA deemed trust and no finding of paramountcy was made in these proceedings, it must be given effect.
[174] The respondents argue that the super-priority charge has priority over any deemed trusts and, therefore, the Reserve Fund should be paid to Sun Indalex, as the principal secured creditor of Indalex U.S. They point to well-established law that authorizes the court to grant super-priority to DIP lenders in CCAA proceedings and argue that without such a charge, DIP lenders will no longer provide financing to companies under CCAA protection. Without DIP funding they say, many companies under CCAA protection will be unable to continue in business until a compromise or arrangement has been worked out. Consequently, companies will file for bankruptcy where deemed trusts have no priority. This, they say, will frustrate the very purpose of the CCAA, which is to facilitate the making of compromises or arrangements between insolvent debtor companies and their creditors.
[175] There is a great deal of force to the respondents’ submissions. Indeed, in general, I agree with them. It is important that the courts not address the interests of pension plan beneficiaries in a manner that thwarts or even discourages DIP funding in future CCAA proceedings. Nonetheless, in the circumstances of this case, it is my view that the Monitor should be ordered to pay the amount of the deficiency, from the Reserve Fund, into the Salaried Plan.
[176] The CCAA court has the authority to grant a super-priority charge to DIP lenders in CCAA proceedings.[16] I fully accept that the CCAA judge can make an order granting a super-priority charge that has the effect of overriding provincial legislation, including the PBA. I also accept that without such a charge, DIP lenders may be unwilling to provide financing to companies under CCAA protection. However, this does not mean that the super-priority charge in question has the effect of overriding the deemed trust. To decide whether it does, one must turn to the doctrine of paramountcy.
[177] Valid provincial laws continue to apply in federally regulated bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings absent an express finding of federal paramountcy. The onus is on the party relying on the doctrine of paramountcy to demonstrate that the federal and provincial laws are incompatible by establishing either that it is impossible to comply with both laws or that to apply the provincial law would frustrate the purpose of the federal law: see Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 75 and Nortel Networks Corp. (Re) (2009), 99 O.R. (3d) 708 (C.A.), at para. 38, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused, [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 531.
[178] In this case, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the issue of paramountcy was invoked on April 8, 2009, when Morawetz J. amended the Initial Order to include the super-priority charge. The documents before the court at that time did not alert the court to the issue or suggest that the PBA deemed trust would have to be overridden in order for Indalex to proceed with its DIP financing efforts while under CCAA protection. To the contrary, the affidavit of Timothy Stubbs, the then CEO of Indalex, sworn April 3, 2009, was the primary source of information before the court. In para. 74 of his affidavit, Mr. Stubbs deposes that Indalex intended to comply with all applicable laws including “regulatory deemed trust requirements”.
[179] While the super-priority charge provides that it ranks in priority over trusts, “statutory or otherwise”, I do not read it as taking priority over the deemed trust in this case because the deemed trust was not identified by the court at the time the charge was granted and the affidavit evidence suggested such a priority was unnecessary. As no finding of paramountcy was made, valid provincial laws continue to operate: the super-priority charge does not override the PBA deemed trust. The two operate sequentially, with the deemed trust being satisfied first from the Reserve Fund.
[180] Does this conclusion thwart the purpose of the CCAA regime, which is to facilitate the restructuring of failing businesses to avoid bankruptcy and liquidation? It does not appear that would have happened in the present case. The granting of a stay in a CCAA proceeding provides a company with breathing space so that it can restructure. In this case, the stay of proceedings gave Indalex the breathing space it needed to effect a sale of its business. Recall that this was a “liquidating CCAA” from the outset. There was no restructuring of the company. There was no plan of compromise or arrangement prepared and presented to creditors. Within days of obtaining CCAA protection, Indalex began a marketing process to sell itself. Very shortly thereafter, it sold its business as a going-concern. There is nothing in the record to suggest that giving the deemed trust priority would have frustrated Indalex’s efforts to sell itself as a going-concern business.
[181] What of the contention that recognition of the deemed trust will cause DIP lenders to be unwilling to advance funds in CCAA proceedings? It is important to recognize that the conclusion I have reached does not mean that a finding of paramountcy will never be made. That determination must be made on a case by case basis. There may well be situations in which paramountcy is invoked and the record satisfies the CCAA judge that application of the provincial legislation would frustrate the company’s ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy. But, this depends on the applicant clearly raising the issue of paramountcy, which will alert affected parties to the risks to their interests and put them in a position where they can take steps to protect their rights. That, however, is not this case.
[182] Nor am I persuaded by the argument that if the deemed trust is given effect in the unique circumstances of this case, companies will file for bankruptcy instead of moving for CCAA protection. This argument suggests that companies will act based on the desire to avoid their pension obligations. That motivation does not conform with the obligations that directors owe to the corporation. The obligation to act in the best interests of the corporation suggests that companies will choose the route that maximizes recovery for creditors. As the respondents point out, Indalex sought a going-concern sale for exactly that reason. In addition, by selling its business as a going concern, Indalex preserved value for suppliers and customers who can continue to do business with the purchaser and preserved approximately 950 jobs for its former employees. Surely the desire to maximize recovery for their creditors – along with those other considerations – would have prevailed had Indalex known it would have to satisfy the deemed trust when considering whether to pursue bankruptcy or CCAA proceedings. In this regard, it is worth recalling that consideration for the sale exceeded $151 million, all DIP lenders were repaid in full, the Reserve Fund consists of undistributed proceeds, and the total deficiencies in the Plans appear to be approximately $6.75 million.
[183] As for the suggestion that Indalex will pursue its bankruptcy motion in order to defeat the deemed trust, I would simply echo the comments of the CCAA judge that a voluntary assignment into bankruptcy should not be used to defeat a secured claim under valid provincial legislation. I would add this additional consideration: it is inappropriate for a CCAA applicant with a fiduciary duty to pension plan beneficiaries to seek to avoid those obligations to the benefit of a related party by invoking bankruptcy proceedings when no other creditor seeks to do so.
[184] There is also the matter of Indalex U.S.’s apparent reliance on the super-priority charge when it gave the Guarantee. As explained more fully above, Indalex U.S. was fully aware of Indalex’s obligations to the Plans when it entered into the Guarantee. Again as explained more fully above, there were a number of different steps that Indalex could have taken to deal with these obligations. It chose not to. This is not a case in which the secured creditor is an arm’s length third party taken by surprise by the claims of the Plans’ beneficiaries.
[185] A final consideration that must be addressed at this stage arises from the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Century Services, which was released after the oral hearing of the appeals. The parties were invited to make written submissions on the impact of Century Services, if any, on these appeals. I am grateful for the excellence of those submissions, which mirrors the quality of the original submissions.
[186] Century Services deals with conflicting provisions in two pieces of federal legislation: s. 222(3) of the Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15, which gives the federal Crown a deemed trust for unpaid GST, and s. 18.3(1) (now s. 37) of the CCAA, which expressly excludes deemed trusts in favour of the Crown from applying in CCAA proceedings. Deschamps J., for the majority, conducted a comprehensive analysis of the two conflicting sections and held that s. 18.3(1) of the CCAA prevails. In sum, Century Services stands for the proposition that s. 18.3(1) of the CCAA excludes the deemed trust for unpaid GST created by s. 222 of the Excise Tax Act from applying in a CCAA proceeding.
[187] It will be readily apparent that Century Services is distinguishable from the present case in a number of ways. Three significant differences between it and the present appeals are worthy of note.
[188] First, in Century Services, reorganization efforts had failed and the company sought leave to make an assignment into bankruptcy. Liquidation on a piecemeal basis through bankruptcy was inevitable. The CCAA proceedings in the present case, on the other hand, were successful – they resulted in the sale of Indalex’s assets and the continuation of the business, albeit through another entity. It is not a situation in which transition to the bankruptcy regime was inevitable because efforts under the CCAA had failed.
[189] Second, Century Services deals with competing provisions in two federal statutes. The conflict between the two provisions was patent: one or the other had to prevail. They could not be read together. Section 18.3(1) was found to prevail, in part because of its wording, which expressly excludes a deemed trust in favour of the Crown. The present appeals involve a consideration of the doctrine of federal paramountcy and whether a deemed trust under provincial legislation applies to a charge granted in a CCAA proceeding. Significantly, unlike the situation in Century Services, there is nothing in the CCAA that expressly excludes the provincial deemed trust for unpaid pension contributions from applying in CCAA proceedings. In these appeals, exclusion of the provincial deemed trust is dependent on the CCAA judge engaging in a factual examination and a determination that preservation of pension rights through the deemed trust would frustrate the purpose of the CCAA proceeding. Moreover, it is difficult to see how a finding of paramountcy would have been made on the record at the time the super-priority charge was made, given the evidence that Indalex intended to comply with all regulatory deemed trust requirements.[17]
[190] Third, no issue of fiduciary duty arose in Century Services. In the present case, as discussed previously and again below, the impact of fiduciary duties during the CCAA proceeding plays a significant role.
[191] The respondents contend that Century Services is crucial in the disposition of these appeals because it stands for the proposition that federal priorities under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 (BIA) apply in CCAA proceedings. If Century Services stood for that proposition, I would agree. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly said that a province cannot, by legislating a deemed trust, alter the scheme of priorities under the BIA: see, for example, British Columbia v. Henfrey Samson Belair Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 24.
[192] However, in my view, Century Services does not stand for that unqualified proposition. In Century Services, Deschamps J. explains that the CCAA and BIA are to be read in an integrated fashion but she is at pains to say that the BIA scheme of liquidation and distribution is the backdrop for what happens if a CCAA reorganization is unsuccessful.[18] Here, as I have noted, the CCAA proceedings were successful.
[193] Moreover, Deschamps J. repeatedly distinguishes the two regimes on the basis that the BIA is “characterized by a rules-based approach”[19] whereas the CCAA “offers a more flexible mechanism with greater judicial discretion”.[20] Permitting the PBA deemed trust to survive, absent an express finding of paramountcy, is consistent with both those key features of the CCAA proceedings – greater flexibility and greater judicial discretion on the part of the CCAA court. This flexibility and discretion on the part of the CCAA court enables it to meaningfully assess the baseline considerations of appropriateness, good faith and due diligence, referred to by Deschamps J. at para. 70 of Century Services.
[194] The respondents point to paras. 47, 48 and 76 of Century Services, in which Deschamps J. notes the “strange asymmetry” that would occur if the ETA Crown priority were interpreted differently in CCAA proceedings than in BIA proceedings. She says this would encourage forum shopping in cases where the debtor’s assets cannot satisfy both the secured creditors’ and the Crown’s claims. No “strange asymmetry” would occur in cases such as the present appeals. If the CCAA judge found that recognition of the PBA deemed trust would frustrate the purpose of the CCAA proceeding and paramountcy had been invoked, the CCAA judge would be free to make a super-priority charge that overrode the deemed trust. This approach leaves the CCAA court with greater flexibility and the ability to be “cognizant of the various interests at stake in the reorganization, which can extend beyond those of the debtor and creditors to include employees”.[21]
[195] In para. 70 of her reasons, Deschamps J. exhorts the CCAA courts to be “mindful that chances for successful reorganizations are enhanced where participants achieve common ground and all stakeholders are treated as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit” [emphasis added]. The Plans’ beneficiaries are stakeholders. And, once the deemed trust claims are recognized, they are not to be treated as mere unsecured creditors. If, as the respondents contend based on Century Services, the deemed trusts are automatically overridden, there will be no incentive for companies that are similarly situated to Indalex to attempt to deal with their underfunded pension plans. There will be no incentive to treat pension plan beneficiaries “as advantageously and fairly as the circumstances permit”. The incentive will be to do as Indalex did – go to court without notice to the affected pension plan beneficiaries and negotiate as if the pension obligations did not exist.
[196] Justice Deschamps also says that no “gap” should exist between the BIA and the CCAA and approves of Laskin J.A.’s reasoning to that effect at paras. 62-63 of Ivaco.[22] She explains that the gap is a situation “which would allow the enforcement of property interests at the conclusion of CCAA proceedings that would be lost in bankruptcy”. When the facts of the present case are considered carefully, it can be seen that a gap of this sort will not occur should the appeals be allowed. As I see it, the deemed trusts continued to exist during the CCAA proceedings although no steps could be taken to enforce them during the proceedings because of the stay. By the time of the Sale Approval Order, the CCAA court had become aware of the deemed trust claims. It dealt with the deemed trust claims as part of the CCAA proceedings, by deciding whether the undistributed sales proceeds held by the Monitor should go to Indalex U.S. or to the Plans’ beneficiaries. Thus, rather than being a situation in which property interests that would be lost in bankruptcy were enforced at the conclusion of the CCAA proceedings, the property interests were dealt with as part of the CCAA proceedings.
[197] However, even if I am wrong in concluding that the deemed trust has priority over the secured creditor in this case, I would make the order on the basis that it is the appropriate remedy for the breaches of fiduciary obligation.
[198] It is important to keep in mind that the contest over the Reserve Fund is not a fight between the DIP lenders and the pensioners. The DIP lenders have been paid in full. The dispute is between the pensioners and Sun Indalex, the principal secured creditor of Indalex U.S. It is in that context that the court must consider the competing equities.
[199] The CCAA was not designed to allow a company to avoid its pension obligations. To give effect to Indalex U.S.’s claim would be to sanction Indalex’s breaches of fiduciary obligation. In the circumstances of this case, such a result would work an injustice. The equities are not equal. The Plans’ beneficiaries were vulnerable to the exercise of power by Indalex. They were not part of the negotiations for the DIP financing nor were they involved in the sale negotiations. They had no opportunity to protect their interests and, as a result of Indalex’s actions, there was no one who fulfilled the administrator’s role. Indalex, on the other hand, was fully aware of the Plans’ underfunding and the result to the pensioners of a failure to inject additional funds. It was Indalex who advised the CCAA court that it intended to comply with “regulatory deemed trust requirements”. To permit Sun Indalex to recover on behalf of Indalex U.S. would be to effectively permit the party who breached its fiduciary obligations to take the benefit of those breaches, to the detriment of those to whom the fiduciary obligations were owed.
[200] I do not accept the respondents’ argument that a finding that Indalex breached its fiduciary obligation is irrelevant because it would merely give rise to an unsecured claim and there is no basis for conferring a priority for such a claim. This view fundamentally misunderstands the rights of the pension plan beneficiaries. Even if there is no deemed trust, the Plans’ beneficiaries are not mere unsecured creditors. They are unsecured creditors to whom Indalex owed a fiduciary duty by virtue of its role as the Plans’ administrator. There is a significant difference, in my view, between being a mere unsecured creditor and being an unsecured creditor to whom a fiduciary duty is owed.
[201] Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that equitable remedies are sufficiently flexible that they can be molded to meet the requirements of fairness and justice: see, for example, Canson Enterprises v. Boughton & Co., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, at para. 86 and Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 34.
[202] In Soulos, at para. 36, McLachlin J. (as she then was) writing for the majority, held that constructive trusts may be imposed where “good conscience requires” it. She went on to identify two different types of cases in which constructive trusts may be ordered: 1) those in which property is obtained by a wrongful act of the defendant, notably breach of fiduciary duty or breach of the duty of loyalty; and, 2) those in which there may not have been a wrongful act, but where there has been unjust enrichment. While the second type of case – one in which there is unjust enrichment – is not relevant to these appeals, the first is.
[203] At para. 45 of Soulos, McLachin J. sets out four conditions that should “generally be satisfied” if a constructive trust based on wrongful conduct is to be ordered:
(1) the defendant must have been under an equitable obligation in relation to the activities giving rise to the assets in his or her hands;
(2) the assets in the hands of the defendant must be shown to have resulted from deemed or actual agency activities of the defendant in breach of his or her equitable obligation to the plaintiff;
(3) the plaintiff must show a legitimate reason for seeking a proprietary remedy, either personal or related to the need to ensure that others like the defendant remain faithful to their duties; and
(4) there must be no factors which would render imposition of a constructive trust unjust in all the circumstances of the case; e.g., the interests of intervening creditors must be protected.
[204] As I have already explained, in the circumstances of this case, Indalex’s fiduciary obligations as administrator were engaged in relation to the CCAA proceedings and it is those proceedings that gave rise to the asset (i.e. the Reserve Fund) (condition 1). The assets that would flow to Indalex U.S., absent the constructive trust, are directly connected to the process in which Indalex committed its breaches of fiduciary obligation (condition 2). Without the proprietary remedy, the Plans’ beneficiaries have no meaningful remedy. Moreover, there must be some incentive to require employers who are also the administrators of their pension plans to remain faithful to their duties (condition 3). And, because Indalex U.S. is not an arm’s length innocent third party, imposing a constructive trust in favour of the Plans’ beneficiaries is not unjust (condition 4).
The Executive Plan
[205] As I explained above, it is not clear to me that a deemed trust arose in respect of the underfunded amounts in the Executive Plan because it had not been wound up at the time of sale. However, based on the breaches of fiduciary duty, the court is entitled to consider the equities of the parties competing for the Reserve Fund. For the reasons given in respect of the Salaried Plan in respect of those equities, I would make the same order in respect of the Executive Plan, namely, that the Monitor pay the deficiency from the Reserve Fund to the Executive Plan in priority to those entitled under the super-priority charge.
[206] In light of this conclusion, I find it unnecessary to deal with the Former Executives’ submission that the doctrine of equitable subordination applies to remedy Indalex’s breaches of fiduciary duty. In any event, I would decline to decide that issue as it was not argued below. It offends the general rule that appellate courts are not to entertain new issues on appeal.
[207] Accordingly, I would allow the appeals and declare that the claims of the USW and the Former Executives take priority over the claim asserted by Indalex U.S./Sun Indalex. I would order the Monitor to pay from the Reserve Fund into each of the Salaried Plan and the Executive Plan an amount sufficient to satisfy the deficiencies in each plan. I understand that the Reserve Fund is sufficient to satisfy the Deficiencies but if this proves problematic, the parties may return to the court for direction on that matter.
[208] If the parties are unable to agree on costs, they may make brief written submissions on that matter. The appellants, Morneau and the Superintendent shall file their submissions within fifteen days of the date of release of these reasons. The respondents shall have a further seven days within which to file their submissions.
RELEASED: APR 07 2011 (“JCM”)
“E. E. Gillese J.A.”
“I agree. J. C. MacPherson J.A.”
“I agree. R. G. Juriansz J.A.”
Schedule “A”
Pension Benefits Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.8, ss. 1(1), 8, 14(1), 22, 57(1) – (5), 70(1), 74(1), 75(1), (2), 76
Definitions
“administrator” means the person or persons that administer the pension plan; …
“wind up” means the termination of a pension plan and the distribution of the assets of the pension fund;
Administrator
Requirement
8. (0.1) A pension plan must be administered by a person or entity described in subsection (1).
(0.2) No person or entity other than a person or entity described in subsection (1) shall administer a pension plan.
(1) A pension plan is not eligible for registration unless it is administered by an administrator who is,
(a) the employer or, if there is more than one employer, one or more of the employers;
(b) a pension committee composed of one or more representatives of,
(i) the employer or employers, or any person, other than the employer or employers, required to make contributions under the pension plan, and
(ii) members of the pension plan;
(c) a pension committee composed of representatives of members of the pension plan;
(d) the insurance company that provides the pension benefits under the pension plan, if all the pension benefits under the pension plan are guaranteed by the insurance company;
(e) if the pension plan is a multi-employer pension plan established pursuant to a collective agreement or a trust agreement, a board of trustees appointed pursuant to the pension plan or a trust agreement establishing the pension plan of whom at least one-half are representatives of members of the multi-employer pension plan, and a majority of such representatives of the members shall be Canadian citizens or landed immigrants;
(f) a corporation, board, agency or commission made responsible by an Act of the Legislature for the administration of the pension plan;
(g) a person appointed as administrator by the Superintendent under section 71; or
(h) such other person or entity as may be prescribed.
(2) A pension committee, or a board of trustees, that is the administrator of a pension plan may include a representative or representatives of persons who are receiving pensions under the pension plan.
(3) For the purposes of clause (1) (b), “employer” includes the following persons and entities:
1. Affiliates within the meaning of the Business Corporations Act of the employer.
2. Such other persons or entities, or classes of persons or entities, as may be prescribed.
Reduction of benefits
14. (1) An amendment to a pension plan is void if the amendment purports to reduce,
(a) the amount or the commuted value of a pension benefit accrued under the pension plan with respect to employment before the effective date of the amendment;
(b) the amount or the commuted value of a pension or a deferred pension accrued under the pension plan; or
(c) the amount or the commuted value of an ancillary benefit for which a member or former member has met all eligibility requirements under the pension plan necessary to exercise the right to receive payment of the benefit.
Care, diligence and skill
22. (1)The administrator of a pension plan shall exercise the care, diligence and skill in the administration and investment of the pension fund that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with the property of another person.
(2)The administrator of a pension plan shall use in the administration of the pension plan and in the administration and investment of the pension fund all relevant knowledge and skill that the administrator possesses or, by reason of the administrator’s profession, business or calling, ought to possess.
Member of pension committee, etc.
(3)Subsection (2) applies with necessary modifications to a member of a pension committee or board of trustees that is the administrator of a pension plan and to a member of a board, agency or commission made responsible by an Act of the Legislature for the administration of a pension plan.
(4)An administrator or, if the administrator is a pension committee or a board of trustees, a member of the committee or board that is the administrator of a pension plan shall not knowingly permit the administrator’s interest to conflict with the administrator’s duties and powers in respect of the pension fund.
(5)Where it is reasonable and prudent in the circumstances so to do, the administrator of a pension plan may employ one or more agents to carry out any act required to be done in the administration of the pension plan and in the administration and investment of the pension fund.
(6)No person other than a prescribed person shall be a trustee of a pension fund.
(7)An administrator of a pension plan who employs an agent shall personally select the agent and be satisfied of the agent’s suitability to perform the act for which the agent is employed, and the administrator shall carry out such supervision of the agent as is prudent and reasonable.
(8)An employee or agent of an administrator is also subject to the standards that apply to the administrator under subsections (1), (2) and (4).
Trust property
57. (1) Where an employer receives money from an employee under an arrangement that the employer will pay the money into a pension fund as the employee’s contribution under the pension plan, the employer shall be deemed to hold the money in trust for the employee until the employer pays the money into the pension fund.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), money withheld by an employer, whether by payroll deduction or otherwise, from money payable to an employee shall be deemed to be money received by the employer from the employee.
(3) An employer who is required to pay contributions to a pension fund shall be deemed to hold in trust for the beneficiaries of the pension plan an amount of money equal to the employer contributions due and not paid into the pension fund.
Wind Up
(4) Where a pension plan is wound up in whole or in part, an employer who is required to pay contributions to the pension fund shall be deemed to hold in trust for the beneficiaries of the pension plan an amount of money equal to employer contributions accrued to the date of the wind up but not yet due under the plan or regulations.
Lien and charge
(5) The administrator of the pension plan has a lien and charge on the assets of the employer in an amount equal to the amounts deemed to be held in trust under subsections (1), (3) and (4).
70. (1) The administrator of a pension plan that is to be wound up in whole or in part shall file a wind up report that sets out,
(a) the assets and liabilities of the pension plan;
(b) the benefits to be provided under the pension plan to members, former members and other persons;
(c) the methods of allocating and distributing the assets of the pension plan and determining the priorities for payment of benefits; and
(d) such other information as is prescribed.
Combination of age and years of employment
74. (1) A member in Ontario of a pension plan whose combination of age plus years of continuous employment or membership in the pension plan equals at least fifty-five, at the effective date of the wind up of the pension plan in whole or in part, has the right to receive,
(a) a pension in accordance with the terms of the pension plan, if, under the pension plan, the member is eligible for immediate payment of the pension benefit;
(b) a pension in accordance with the terms of the pension plan, beginning at the earlier of,
(i) the normal retirement date under the pension plan, or
(ii) the date on which the member would be entitled to an unreduced pension under the pension plan if the pension plan were not wound up and if the member’s membership continued to that date; or
(c) a reduced pension in the amount payable under the terms of the pension plan beginning on the date on which the member would be entitled to the reduced pension under the pension plan if the pension plan were not wound up and if the member’s membership continued to that date.
Liability of employer on wind up
75. (1) Where a pension plan is wound up in whole or in part, the employer shall pay into the pension fund,
(a) an amount equal to the total of all payments that, under this Act, the regulations and the pension plan, are due or that have accrued and that have not been paid into the pension fund; and
(b) an amount equal to the amount by which,
(i) the value of the pension benefits under the pension plan that would be guaranteed by the Guarantee Fund under this Act and the regulations if the Superintendent declares that the Guarantee Fund applies to the pension plan,
(ii) the value of the pension benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario vested under the pension plan, and
(iii) the value of benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario resulting from the application of subsection 39 (3) (50 per cent rule) and section 74,
exceed the value of the assets of the pension fund allocated as prescribed for payment of pension benefits accrued with respect to employment in Ontario.
(2) The employer shall pay the money due under subsection (1) in the prescribed manner and at the prescribed times.
Pension fund continues subject to Act and regulations
76. The pension fund of a pension plan that is wound up continues to be subject to this Act and the regulations until all the assets of the pension fund have been disbursed.
Schedule “B”
Pension Benefits Act, Regulation 909, R.R.O. 1990, s. 31(1), (2) and (3)
31. (1) The liability to be funded under section 75 of the Act shall be funded by annual special payments commencing at the effective date of the wind up and made by the employer to the pension fund.
(2) The special payments under subsection (1) for each year shall be at least equal to the greater of,
(a) the amount required in the year to fund the employer’s liabilities under section 75 of the Act in equal payments, payable annually in advance, over not more than five years; and
(b) the minimum special payments required for the year in which the plan is wound up, as determined in the reports filed or submitted under sections 3, 4, 5.3, 13 and 14, multiplied by the ratio of the basic Ontario liabilities of the plan to the total of the liabilities and increased liabilities of the plan as determined under clauses 30(2)(b) and (c).
(3) The special payments referred to in subsections (1) and (2) shall continue until the liability is funded.
[1] The Monitor retained the Reserve Fund as part of the Undistributed Proceeds. The Undistributed Proceeds also include amounts for the payment of cure costs, other costs associated with the completion of the SAPA transaction, legal and professional fees, and amounts owing under the DIP charge.
[2] The appellants had raised this issue below but it had not been dealt with by the CCAA judge.
[3] Or, in the case of a multi-employer plan, the administrator.
[4] Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 26.
[5] Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Financial Services), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 152, at para. 13, relying on Gencorp Canada Inc. v. Ontario (Superintendent of Pensions) (1998), 158 D.L.R. (4th) 497 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 503.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Bourdon v. Stelco Inc., [2005] S.C.R. 279, at para. 24.
[8] At para. 26.
[9] At para. 11.
[10] Burke v. Hudson’s Bay Co., [2010] 2 S.C.R. 273, at paras. 39-41.
[11] Hodgkinson v. Simms, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 377, at para. 32.
[12] Ibid., at para. 30; Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574, at p. 646.
[13] In contrast, Quebec legislation requires that plan administration be entrusted to a pension committee of at least three persons, including a representative of each of the active and inactive members of the plan and an independent member. See Supplemental Pension Plans Act, R.S.Q. c. R-15.1, s. 147.
[14] On advice of counsel, Mr. Cooper refused to answer questions about what, if any, steps were taken to have the purchaser take over the Plans.
[15] To the extent that the U.S. Trustee suggests that the Former Executives raised the deemed trust issue at the motion heard on June 12, 2010, I reject this submission. As explained in the background portion of these reasons, the Former Executives’ reservation of rights on June 12, 2010, was to obtain time to confirm that the motion related solely to an increase in the DIP loan amount.
[16] See, for example, InterTAN Canada Ltd.(Re), (2009), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 232 (Ont. S.C.). And, the granting of super-priority charges is referred to with approval in Century Services, at para. 62.
[17] See para. 178 of these reasons.
[18] See, for example, para. 23.
[19] At para. 13, for example.
[20] See, for example, para. 14.
[21] Century Services, at para. 60.
[22] At para. 78.